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Overview
The structure and function o f organized inter­
ests differs between countries, sectors, social 
categories, target environments and the sub­
stance of the interests involved, as well as over 
tim e. W hile som e in terest organizations 
remain highly fluid and informal, others are 
firmly established and institutionalized; while 
some are narrow and specialized, others are 
broad-based and encompassing. The range of 
variation extends from single-purpose ‘pres­
sure groups’ that may exist only for a limited 
time, to ‘quasi-non-govemmental organiza­
tions’ that regulate the behaviour of their 
members in line with a negotiated or imposed 
‘public interest’. Accordingly, the study of 
interest groups covers anything from bird 
watchers to international trade union confed­
erations. Organized economic interests, on 
which this entry focuses, date back to the rise 
of ‘organized capitalism’ at the end of the 
nineteenth century, and their development 
was always closely related to that of the mod­
ern n a tion -sta te . W hile they also differ 
widely, their organizational structures tend to 
be comparatively permanent and formalized.
This entry begins with a brief introduction 
to relevant theories o f collective action and to 
a number of central concepts o f interest group
analysis, especially intermediary organiza­
tion, corporatism, organizational properties, 
organizational development, and association­
al systems. It then proceeds to discuss in more 
depth the two most important economic inter­
est groups, unions and business associations. 
This is followed by remarks on the relation­
ship o f organized interests to the public order 
and to economic perform ance. The entry 
closes with observations an organized inter­
ests in transnational settings and on the future 
of organized interests generally.
I Collective interests, collective 
action, and in terest group 
organization
Most of the modem literature on organized 
interests proceeds from  a now generally 
shared analysis o f what is seen as a potentially 
self-defeating logic of rationally motivated 
collective action. The achievements of a col­
lective interest organization tend to be collec­
tive goods for the group whose interests the 
organization represents. That is, the benefits 
of organized collective action on behalf o f a 
group cannot typically be withheld from indi­
vidual members of that group, regardless of 
whether they have contributed to their produc­
tion or not. Especially where the number of 
potential beneficiaries is large, and the poten­
tial contribution of any individual group 
member therefore marginal, there may be a 
strong incentive for rational actors not to con­
tribute to the costs o f  organized collective 
action, although this may eventually mean 
that a generally desired collective good will 
not be produced.
As Mancur Olson has pointed out, orga­
nized interest groups typically try to close the 
gap between individual and collective ratio­
nality by offering their clients so-called ‘out­
side inducements’ (Olson 1971). Unlike the 
collective benefits for the pursuit of which in­
terests become originally organized, outside 
inducements can be selectively reserved to
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members or contributors to the organization. 
Outside inducements may consist in special 
economic rewards or in ideological approval; 
they also include (the threat of) compulsion. 
The success of collective interest organization 
depends to a large extent on whether organiz­
ers ( ‘interest entrepreneurs’) have or can ac­
quire the means to generate a sufficient supply 
of outside inducements.
Interest organizations translate individual 
into collective interests, and collective inter­
ests into organizational goals; in so doing they 
aggregate and operationally define the inter­
ests they represent. In this they confront a 
number of further dilemmas. For example, the 
closer the goal of an interest organization to 
what its members perceive to be their inter­
ests, the easier it should be for the organiza­
tion to rely on the intrinsic attraction of its 
primary objectives to motivate contributions 
from members and potential members. But 
perceived interests and organizational goals 
are likely to be close to each other only if the 
represented group is homogeneous and, as a 
consequence, small. W hile small groups may 
more easily overcome the collective goods 
problems of collective action, however, they 
are likely to be less politically effective than 
they could be if  they were broader based. On 
the other hand, organizations representing 
large and therefore, ceteris paribus, hetero­
geneous groups have to aggregate a wide 
range of special interests into a common col­
lective interest that must inevitably appear di­
luted from the perspective of subgroups or 
individual members. The more removed the 
goal of an interest organization from the spe­
cific experience of its individual members, the 
less it is likely to be of use for motivating con­
tributions, forcing the organization to rely in­
creasingly on outside inducements. To the 
extent that large size and a broad membership 
base enhance an interest organization’s politi­
cal influence, there may therefore be a conflict 
between representativeness and effectiveness 
(Child e ta l. 1973).
2 Intermediary organization
Interest organizations are usually voluntary 
associations created to promote the interests 
of their members in relation to other political
and economic actors. In pursuing their objec­
tives they interact with their constituency on 
the one hand and other organized groups and 
the state on the other (Schmitter and Streeck 
1999). The interaction between an interest 
organization and its constituents is governed 
by the interest perceptions and demands of the 
latter; by the willingness of the members to 
comply with decisions made on their behalf; 
by the means available to the organization for 
controlling its members; and by the collective 
benefits and outside inducements the organi­
zation has to offer: together these constitute 
what has been called an organization’s logic 
of membership. The interaction between an 
interest organization and its target environ­
ment is affected by the demands the organiza­
tion makes on the latter; the incentives the 
organization has to offer its interlocutors; the 
compromises it is willing and able to negoti­
ate; and the extent to which it can ‘deliver’ its 
constituents. This interaction will also be 
affected by the constraints and opportunities 
offered by the target environment, especially 
for the establishment of lasting relations of 
political exchange; the concessions offered to 
the organization; and the degree to which the 
organization is granted privileged access and 
status within its institutional context. This 
interaction reflects what may be referred to as 
a logic o f influence.
To establish themselves safely and mediate 
effectively between their two environments, 
interest organizations must build organiza­
tional structures that can respond to both 
logics sim ultaneously (see ORGANIZATION 
STRUCTURE). As the demands made on inter­
est organizations by members and interlocu­
tors may be different and indeed sometimes 
contradictory, this involves complex choices. 
Successful management of the logic of mem­
bership requires authentic representation of 
member perceptions and demands, while po­
litical influence often depends on a capacity to 
moderate member demands and offer com­
promises in exchange for concessions. More­
over, the logic of membership speaks for the 
formation of homogeneous and, as a result, 
small organizations. Typically these must 
compete with other small organizations repre­
senting equally narrow special interests, in­
side a fragmented system of interest group
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pluralism (see below). By comparison, the 
logic of influence tends to place a premium on 
interest organizations being broadly rather 
than narrowly based, and representing more 
general instead of highly special interests. 
This is because encompassing organization 
makes collective interests more negotiable 
and reduces transaction costs for interlocu­
tors. To build lasting relations of political ex­
change with their interlocutors, as well as 
enhance their own stability and security, inter­
est organizations may therefore require orga­
nizational characteristics that may make it 
more difficult for them to procure legitimacy 
for themselves under the logic of membership.
To become part of what the literature calls 
a corporatist system of interest intermedia­
tion, interest organizations must develop their 
organizational properties so as to become cor­
porate actors in their own right. In this they 
may draw on the support o f actors in their in­
fluence environment, to the extent that these 
are interested in stable, reliable and above all 
moderate representation of the groups in ques­
tion (see CORPORATISM). To generate member
compliance and ensure moderation of de­
mands and adherence to negotiated agree­
ments, interest organizations can often rely on 
organizational privileges granted to them by 
their interlocutors, in exchange for delivering 
the discipline of their members. In the process 
they may cease to be just ‘pressure groups’, or 
‘lobbies’, and turn into private governments, 
or agents o f collective self-regulation (Streeck 
and Schmitter 1985). Organizations that be­
come too closely involved in the logic of influ­
ence, however, may cease to be intermediary 
organizations and turn into extended arms of 
the government (i.e. into quasi-govemmental 
agencies) or become representatives of inter­
ests opposed to those of their constituents 
( ‘yellow unions’). Striking a balance between 
weakly organized, fragmented, competitive 
and member-responsive pluralism on the one 
hand and absorption into their institutional 
target environment on the other is the central 
political and organizational problem for inter­
mediary organizations (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 The logic o f m em bership and influence
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3 Development of 
organizational properties
As interest organizations become going con­
cerns, they tend to develop interests in them­
selves that add to and modify the interests of 
their members and the pressures emanating 
from the logic of influence. In much of tradi­
tional sociology, these secondary interests are 
identified with those of the organization’s 
‘bureaucracy’. More generally, such interests 
can be said to reflect pressures to economize 
on the costs of collective action, through pro­
fessional management and the routinization of 
internal procedures and external political 
access. Organizational stability and security, 
which protect past investment in collective 
action capacity, are sought especially by an 
organization’s professional staff, who are typ­
ically interested in a stable and independent 
stream of income for the organization as a 
condition of their own economic security. A 
driving force in the development of organiza­
tional properties tends to be an organization’s 
professional staff, which is typically inter­
ested in a stable and independent stream of 
income for the organization as a condition of 
its own economic security.
Developing interest organizations seek 
stable relations, not just with their constitu­
ents, but also with their target environment -  
the former by turning clients into members 
with formally defined duties o f material sup­
port and political discipline, and the latter 
through mutually agreed routinized proce­
dures of consultation, negotiation and politi­
cal exchange. In this way interest organiza­
tions try to limit their resource dependency on 
their two main environments. To the extent 
that an organization’s original goals are not or 
only partly compatible with the development 
of organizational properties, processes of goal 
displacement can be observed as interest 
groups cease to be social movements and as­
sume features of formal organizations.
Increasing formalization of relations be­
tween an interest organization and its mem­
bers strengthens m em ber d iscip line  and 
thereby enhances the negotiating capacity of 
the organization in its target environment. To 
the extent that this improves the organiza­
tion’s ability to provide its members with col­
lective goods or outside inducements, better 
adjustment to the logic of influence may in­
crease its legitimacy under the logic of mem­
bersh ip . An organ izationally  developed 
interest group that is firmly established in the 
polity-at-large can, however, also afford to 
disappoint member expectations where these 
are not realistic or where longer-term inter­
ests, including those in the external recogni­
tion  o f the o rg an iza tio n  i ts e lf  and the 
continuity of its political access, require con­
cessions to powerful interlocutors. Well- 
developed interm ediary organizations, in 
other words, can rely on resources supplied by 
their target environment under the logic of in­
fluence to control their member environment 
under the logic of membership, and not just 
vice versa (see Figure 1).
Put differently, as interest organizations 
become more organized, their interlocutors 
under the logic of influence may offer them 
various sorts of support in managing their 
logic of membership. In exchange, interest or­
ganizations may moderate their goals, defin­
ing their members’ interests in ways that are 
more compatible with the demands of their in­
fluence environment (the ‘polity’); this pro­
cess has been described as political exchange. 
As noted, broader-based and more heteroge­
neous interest organizations are more autono­
mous with respect to the definition of their 
goals. This is why interlocutors o f organized 
interest groups sometimes offer them incen­
tives for, and assistance in, expanding their 
domains and consolidating into what Olson 
calls an ‘encompassing organization’.
One way in which governments and orga­
nized interlocutors may reinforce an interest 
organization’s governing properties is by 
granting it a monopoly of representation. 
Where such a monopoly exists, as it often does 
in corporatist systems of interest intermedi­
ation, dissatisfied members cannot easily 
sanction the organization by resigning from it. 
Similarly, governments may explicitly or im­
plicitly recognize decisions made, or agree­
ments negotiated, by an interest organization 
as equivalent to public legislation. They may 
also make binding such decisions or agree­
ments to all members of a given group, regard­
less of whether or not they have joined the 
organization, creating a strong incentive to
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jo in  it in order to be able to influence it. It is 
also possible that governments make m em ­
bership in certain interest organizations com­
pulsory, the best-known example being the 
Business Chamber in Austria (Wirtschafts­
kammer Österreich) which is the country’s 
main employers’ association.
4 Associational systems
Interest organizations exist within national or 
sectoral systems o f organized interests that 
consist o f populations of organizations repre­
senting related and conflicting interests (see 
EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION). Organizations 
that belong to the same associational system 
tend to have similar characteristics, because 
they m ust respond to identical or symmetrical 
constraints and opportunities. For example, 
where unions are weakly developed and frag­
mented, the same tends to be true of employ­
ers and business associations. Also, where one 
group is organized in a  corporatist fashion, 
others are unlikely to be organized in a plural­
ist mode.
Although it is possible that related interests 
are represented by just one encompassing or­
ganization -  as is by and large the case in the 
organization of business interests in Austria -  
usually the representation of a given social 
category is divided between several organiza­
tions. Populations of related interest groups 
vary with respect to the degree of their organi­
zational fragmentation; the more units they 
contain, the smaller and more internally ho­
mogeneous these are, and the more likely 
there will be competition between them, for 
members as well as for influence. To elimi­
nate competition, economize on scarce re­
sources and increase their political influence, 
related interest groups may merge. Alterna­
tively, where internalization of differences 
among related interests in one encompassing 
organization is not possible or deemed unde­
sirable, interest organizations may form vari­
ous sorts o f alliances to share facilities and 
coordinate efforts in relation to joint task envi­
ronments.
Coordination between organizations of re­
lated interests can take a wide variety of 
forms. In some cases it may be a perfect sub­
stitute for encompassing organization, with
respect to the aggregation  o f  divergent 
member interests as well as the achievement 
of representational monopoly. Strong forms 
of external as distinguished from internalized 
coordination are associations of associations, 
or higher-order associations, sometimes cul­
minating in national or supranational peak as­
sociations. These may themselves assume 
characteristics of corporate actors and exert 
considerable control over their affiliates. 
While federal structures o f this sort, which 
in some countries extend over three or four 
hierarchical levels, may be expected to be 
somewhat less restrictive than unitary organi­
zations with respect to the articulation of sub­
group interests, in practice even the most 
unitary interest organization must allow sub­
groups in its constituency some degree of in­
dependent expression.
Summing up so far, pluralist systems of or­
ganized interests consist of narrowly based 
and, ceteris paribus, small independent units 
with self-defined domains attuned to the logic 
o f membership. M aterial resources come 
mainly from members; as in social move­
ments, their supply expresses and depends on 
spontaneous and voluntary support for current 
policies. Within their target environments, 
pluralist interest organizations have no privi­
leged status and remain independent from 
their interlocutors. As a result their policies 
tend to correspond closely to the short-term 
perspectives of their members. To avoid ruin­
ous competition, pluralist interest organiza­
tions come under political and economic 
pressure to seek external coordination with re­
lated interests through inter-organizational re­
lations; sometimes this leads to hierarchical 
affiliation to higher-order associations. By 
comparison, broad-based and, as a conse­
quence, large organizations, as characteristic 
of corporatist systems of interest intermedi­
ation, internalize coordination functions; 
while their structures must therefore be more 
complex, the associational systems of which 
they are part are simpler and external coordi­
nation, including avoidance of domain over­
lap, is easier.
Sim plification o f associational systems 
through integration of related but diverse in­
terests in encompassing organizations, and 
successful management of the resulting inter­
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nal diversity, is facilitated by political recog­
nition and material support from the target 
environment; such support may be offered in 
exchange for improved aggregation and in­
creased moderation of demands, and gener­
ally for assumption of responsibility for the 
enforcement of agreements and for self-regu­
lation in the ‘public interest’ (see below). As­
sumption of such responsibilities, as a way of 
giving associations access to external support 
for expanding and stabilizing their domains, 
improving their ability to control their mem­
bers, enabling them to rationalize their opera­
tions, and making their access to interlocutors 
and their supply of resources more reliable, 
turns interest organizations into intermedi­
aries between their members and their target 
environment, with the logic of influence bal­
ancing the logic of membership.
5 Trade unions
As a historically highly influential interest 
group, trade unions represent the interest of 
employees vis-à-vis employers with regard to 
the regulation of the employment relation­
ship, and vis-à-vis public policy with regard to 
the provision of welfare (see TRADE UNIONS). 
Unions’ organizational and political capacity 
depends on the size of their constituency and 
its position in the production process.
Trade unions may organize either small 
and cohesive groups of employees with high 
skills and a strong bargaining position, or 
large numbers of unskilled workers whose 
successful representation requires political 
support. Craft unions representing small 
groups of skilled employees are potentially 
able to control production arrangements, the 
local labour market, and the provision of vo­
cational training. Due to their privileged posi­
tion in the production process, craft unions 
often succeeded in creating entry barriers to 
employment -  making employment condi­
tional on union membership -  and in exercis­
ing effective control over their members, not 
least during strikes. Their influence, however, 
depends on a given organization of work 
which they therefore are bound to defend 
against technological change. General or in­
dustrial unions, which emerged with the in­
crease in the number of unskilled labourers at
the beginning of the twentieth century, are in 
principle open to all workers, regardless of 
skill or trade. They draw strength from mobi­
lizing large numbers, rather than from control 
of sectoral labour markets or specific produc­
tion arrangements. They also rely on political 
in addition to industrial action.
The evolution of trade unions took place in 
close relation with state regulation o f employ­
ment and working conditions. Legal recogni­
tion of trade unions as legitimate collective 
actors often turned into active support for col­
lective organization. G overnm ents often 
helped unions establish a de facto  monopoly 
of representation, for example in Germany 
and Austria where encompassing industrial 
trade unionism is favoured by legal rules on 
collective bargaining and workplace partici­
pation. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, craft 
unions were allowed to enforce compulsory 
membership in post- or pre-entry closed shops 
until the 1980s. Similarly, in many Nordic and 
continental European countries trade unions 
are still in charge o f administering public 
social security funds, which they use to recruit 
members. As governments and employers 
found it more beneficial to deal with organiza­
tionally secure and, as a result, more respon­
sible trade unions, institutional support to help 
unions overcome their collective action prob­
lems was and continues to be frequently pro­
vided.
6 Business and trade  
associations
Business has a twofold interest in collective 
action . E m ployers a sso c ia tio n s are the 
response to the unionization of workers while 
trade associations represent interests in state 
support for free markets and profitability of 
private enterprise (Schm itter and Streeck 
1999). In some countries and sectors, the 
labour market-related ‘social’ interests and 
the product market-related ‘economic’ inter­
ests of business are represented by different 
organizations, or sets o f organizations, where­
as in others they are jointly represented.
Compared to trade unions, business associ­
ations tend to be less cohesive and centralized. 
Despite the fact that there are far fewer firms 
than employees, the number of business asso­
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ciations exceeds that o f trade unions by far. 
One study of the 1980s investigating business 
and labour associations in 56 sectors in nine 
countries found that there were more than 16 
business associations to one trade union 
(Streeck 1992). Business associations are 
fragm ented in both sectoral and regional 
terms. They are also often divided by firm 
size. W hile big firms find it easier to lobby on 
their own, they also have an interest in protec­
tion against excessive trade union demands; 
such protection they may be particularly 
likely to find in an employers association that 
includes also small firms. Size differences be­
tween firms are taken into account by business 
associations linking membership dues to em­
ployment or turnover, and voting rights to 
dues paid. Equal voting rights are found 
mainly in business associations with obliga­
tory membership, such as the Austrian Wirt- 
schaftskammer. Outside Austria, obligatory 
m em bersh ip  in business assoc iations is 
largely confined to the artisanal and small 
business sector.
The comparatively high fragmentation of 
business associations has its source in the 
competitive and business relations between 
firms. W hile competition for workers be­
tween firms in tight labour markets may con­
tribute to collective organization, product 
market competition tends to diversify busi­
ness interests. Also, firms are involved in 
more product than labour markets, leading to 
greater fragmentation of their product-related 
than their employment-related interests. Em­
ployers associations therefore tend to be more 
encompassing than trade associations. More­
over, supplier relationships between firms 
may give rise to further divisions of interest, to 
the extent that large firms may be tempted to 
turn over to their suppliers the costs o f conces­
sions they had to make to trade unions.
7 Interest associations and the 
public order
The rise of powerful interest associations in 
the twentieth century was accompanied by 
their progressive integration in the public 
order. Pluralist political theory assumes that 
the primary purpose o f interest associations is 
lobbying the government. This overlooks the
manifold governing functions performed by 
associations in m odern political systems 
(Grant 1985; Streeck and Schmitter 1985). 
Organized private interests are widely relied 
upon by governments as agencies of state- 
licensed and assisted self-regulation o f groups 
and sectors, providing an attractive alternative 
to direct state intervention. The delegation of 
public policy functions from the state to pri­
vate interest organizations may benefit gov­
ernments especially with respect to gaining 
legitimacy, obtaining expert information, and 
implementing political decisions.
•  In highly contested areas such as employ­
ment and wage regulation, decisions nego­
tiated by associations representative of the 
interests affected may have higher legiti­
macy than government decisions. More­
over, unsatisfactory  outcom es can be 
blamed on the associations and do not in 
principle detract from the legitimacy of the 
government or the state.
•  In areas like technical and product stan­
dardization, governments face almost in­
surmountable problems of obtaining the 
expert information necessary for effective 
regulation. In many countries and sectors, 
this has induced them to delegate gover­
nance functions to interest associations. 
Standard setting in telecommunications, 
for example, has largely been left to associ­
ations of producers, as the complexity of 
relevant technical details often exceeds the 
capacities o f public authorities. In particu­
lar with regard to emerging technologies 
(e.g. the Internet) and emerging markets 
(especially in international finance), where 
regulation often concerns primarily the 
distribution of risks, producer groups are 
frequently invited to negotiate the relevant 
regulations between themselves as they 
seem to be both most directly concerned 
and best informed.
•  Policy implementation can be improved by 
including affected interest associations in 
the formation of policies and charging 
them with supervising their implementa­
tion. Since voluntary associations often 
have greater influence on their members 
than public agencies, voluntary codes of 
behaviour adopted through associations
3188
Interest group organization
may be efficient regulatory instruments. 
This can be observed in areas where collec­
tive action is beset with free rider prob­
lems, such as vocational training. Business 
associations in cooperation with public au­
thorities may be able to persuade compa­
nies to offer training facilities by turning 
training into a matter of reputation. Also, 
moral hazard problems which are particu­
larly prominent in the weakly regulated in­
ternational economy, may be more easily 
overcom e when associations negotiate 
regulations and are in charge of monitoring 
them.
8 Interest associations and 
economic performance
For much of economic theory, organized 
interests reduce the efficiency of an economy 
because they are likely to engage in rent- 
seeking and externalize the costs of their 
activities to outsiders. For instance, business 
organizations might try to restrict market 
entry so as to enable their members to mark up 
the prices of their products. Similarly, unions 
might set wages at levels which lead to a 
reduction in employment at the expense of the 
unemployed. Just as with government inter­
vention, the intervention of association is said 
to distort markets and inhibit market clearing.
However, associations do not always be­
have like rent seekers. W hen the membership 
of an association includes a significant pro­
portion of the general public, the distinction 
between insiders and outsiders may become 
m eaningless (Olson 1982; Calm fors and 
Drifflll 1988). Large encompassing interest 
associations internalize a large share of the 
costs of their activities to society, which may 
make them more responsive to the market. It is 
mainly small and narrowly based associations 
that have an incentive to act as distributional 
coalitions, as they are in much better position 
to externalize the costs of their rent-seeking to 
others. Public intervention via the logic of in­
fluence, inducing associational systems to be­
come less fragmented and associations more 
encompassing, may thus be in the public inter­
est.
Moreover, under certain conditions other 
organizational properties may have the same
effect on associational behaviour as large size. 
For instance, associations that have a monop­
oly of representation often act as though they 
had a high density o f m em bership, even 
though in fact they do not. Monopoly repre­
sentation is often granted on the assumption 
that associations will represent everybody in 
their domain, members or non-members. Fur­
thermore, associations that are in a position 
to set a behaviour pattern for other associa­
tions -  ‘wage leaders’ or ‘price leaders’ -  may 
find it rational also tend to take the external ef­
fects of their actions into account. And associ­
ations involved in close relations of political 
exchange also show a higher degree of re­
sponsiveness and responsibility as their rec­
ognition by their interlocutors is based on an 
assumption of reciprocity.
Associations may also help facilitate and 
coordinate cooperative relations between 
firms. By helping firms share information, as­
sociations may serve as important intermedi­
aries between the market and hierarchical 
decision making. However, although the eco­
nomic literature has investigated the role of 
bounded rationality and uncertainty, little re­
search exists on the contribution potential of 
associations to the production of cooperative 
gains between companies. While trust and 
reputation are often seen as crucial factors ex­
plaining cooperation in non-cooperative 
games, the role o f associations in building 
trust by selecting and disseminating reliable 
information, as well as supporting informal 
network relations, has largely been neglected.
9 Transnational pluralism
Interest group development, from pluralist 
representation to corporatist intermediation, 
depends on the presence of strongly organized 
interlocutors and, above all, on a supportive 
political and legal system. W hile these condi­
tions existed in varying degrees in most if  not 
all advanced nation-states during the twenti­
eth century, they are largely absent in interna­
tional settings. This may explain why most 
interest organizations that operate above the 
nation-state tend to be highly specialized, nar­
row in scope, fragmented, movement-like, 
closely controlled by their members, and not 
well resourced -  unless they are de facto
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quasi-govemmental agencies supported by 
intergovernmental or supranational authori­
ties that depend on them for technical infor­
mation and political legitimacy. Still, interna­
tional agencies seem generally less able than 
national ones to create incentives for, or 
impose obligations on, organized interests to 
negotiate with each other or assume quasi­
public responsib ility  for governing their 
members.
Similarly, nationally organized interests 
often resist being governed by transnational 
peak associations. W here such exist, they are 
mainly used as forums or meeting places for 
the coordination o f what remain basically na­
tional interests. International interest organi­
z a t io n s  th a t  g ro u p  to g e th e r  n a tio n a l  
constituents therefore typically lack impor­
tant characteristics of corporate actors. Even 
inside the European Union, interest organiza­
tion at national level continues to be much 
more developed than at supranational level -  
the latter serving primarily as a lookout post 
for national associations surveying the grow­
ing externalities under which national actors 
must today operate. Another factor that stands 
in the way of national systems of organized in­
terests being absorbed into an encompassing 
supranational system is their vast historically 
grown variety, which makes any transfer of 
governing capacity to the European level un­
predictable and asym metric in its conse­
quences.
Not that the European Union had not tried 
to bring a transnational system of interest 
interm ediation  into being (see EUROPEAN 
u n io n ). In particular, the European Commis­
sion has long undertaken to beef up the Euro­
pean peak associations of business and labour 
by instituting a so-called ‘Social Dialogue’. 
Since 1992, agreement among the ‘social part­
ners’ may even produce European legislation 
on a range of social policy issues. Still, nation­
ally organized interests o f both labour and 
business continue to be unenthusiastic about 
allowing their European representatives to 
make binding decisions on their behalf. M ore­
over, the interest of business in liberalization 
of the European political economy seem to be 
best served if the organized representation of 
employers at European level remains weak 
and therefore unable to commit its constitu­
ents in negotiations with organized labour or 
European authorities. This may be somewhat 
different in policy areas other than social pol­
icy, where the European Commission relies 
heavily on the technical assistance of -  
sectorally highly specialized -  national and 
supranational interest groups.
That supranational and international sys­
tems of interest organization tend to be more 
pluralist than corporatist is also due to the 
strong presence in international settings of 
large multinational firms. Such firms, which 
are usually capable of making themselves 
heard on their own, tend to have little inclina­
tion to have their interests diluted by joint or­
ganization with others. Much attention has 
recently been paid to transnational non­
governmental organizations, like Greenpeace, 
which are essentially social movement-like 
pressure groups funded by voluntary contri­
butions from supporters in developed coun­
tries. T here  are ind ications that certain 
international organizations are beginning to 
rely on them regularly for information and 
mobilization of support, and that their organi­
zational properties are developing as a result.
10 The future of organized 
interests
Recent years have witnessed a declining will­
ingness among individuals and firms to have 
their interests collectively represented. There 
also seems to be a tendency on the part of gov­
ernments to rely less on organized interests for 
the performance of public policy functions 
than was the case in the past. Labour unions in 
most countries are losing members while 
many among the growing number of large 
international firms tend to do their lobbying 
for themselves, even in countries where this 
was not traditionally done. Interests generally 
seem  to becom e m ore specific and less 
amenable to aggregation or generalization. 
While this may be due to changing social atti­
tudes, it may also reflect growing competitive 
pressures and a declining capacity or willing­
ness of governments in a global economy to 
shield national economies from international 
markets. There are also indications that col­
lective goods are valued less than in the past, 
and institutions previously credited with posi­
3190
Interest group organization
tive effects for the collective well-being are 
coming under suspicion for fostering and hid­
ing anti-competitive behaviour.
Present tendencies towards disorganiza­
tion of advanced political economies may, 
however, be overstated. In many European 
countries trade unions are still strong politi­
cally and organizationally. While sectoral col­
lective bargaining may be declining in a 
number of countries, unions continue to be re­
garded by many governments as indispens­
able participants in national social pacts for 
wage moderation and employment. Also, bi­
partite cooperation arrangements between 
governments and organized interest groups 
seem to survive in many sectors, and they are 
growing in various transnational settings 
where a unified political government is miss­
ing. On the other hand, even where corpo­
ratism does not disappear, it is changing under 
pressures on governments to ‘get the incen­
tives right’ and ensure that the costs of the or­
ganized pursuit of collective interests are 
bome by those that also reap the benefits, 
rather than by the public at large. The overall 
impact of these developments on interest or­
ganization in advanced industrial societies is 
uncertain, given the as yet unknown but surely 
fundamental effects of the new information 
technology on service organizations gener­
ally, including organized interests.
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1 Participating in interest groups -  the 
external political environment of 
business
2 Resources with which to influence 
public policies
3 Interest representation in public 
policies
Overview
The term ‘interest group’ is used by different 
writers in different ways. One use is to reserve 
the term for public pressure groups, such as 
consumer, environmental, or animal welfare 
activists. In these accounts, ‘interest groups’ 
are those open to any individual from the gen­
eral public wishing to join, and are to be dis­
tinguished from private associations open 
only to producer interests, such as trade asso­
ciations organizing companies, trade unions 
organizing workers, and associations o f the 
professions. Other accounts, however, use the 
term ‘interest groups’ in a more generic sense 
to cover all of these types of interests, making 
distinctions where necessary between ‘pri­
vate’ and ‘public’ interests. This entry adopts 
the latter, generic use of the term, with cover­
age o f private and public interests from the 
perspective of business.
Interest groups such as trade associations 
represent one way for firms to manage their 
external political environments. For smaller 
firms, they may represent the only practical 
means to do this. For large firms, the tendency 
towards ever-increasing size has resulted in a 
growing number with their own public affairs 
capabilities, with the result that trade associa­
tions are frequently just one amongst a range 
of strategies for companies to influence public 
affairs. These tendencies have resulted in 
greater dialogue between public administra­
tions and companies, and consequent erosion 
of depth in the relationship between business 
interest groups and governments. If  members 
can bypass their trade associations, the influ­
ence of trade associations is likely to be 
eroded.
In general terms, the influence of an inter­
est in public affairs depends mainly upon its 
ability to make itself indispensable by provid­
ing key resources which governments need, 
such as information, expertise, or wealth gen­
erating capacity. Interests in possession of a 
sufficient quality o f these are potentially able 
to operate inside government, where both par­
ties work together in closed policy making 
communities, to the exclusion of others. ‘In­
sider interests’ enjoy monopolistic access 
over public policies, particularly in ‘low 
politics’ fields involving everyday technical 
issues, whereas in ‘high politics’ fields in­
volving politicized issues debated in public 
arenas, they operate on more of a ‘level play­
ing field’ with other types o f interests. ‘Out­
sider’ interests therefore seek to disrupt closed 
‘policy communities’ by politicizing issues.
There are however important qualifica­
tions to be made to these simple rules of influ­
ence. One concerns the ability o f similar 
interests to act together cohesively in interest 
groups. Thus, otherwise resource rich inter­
ests can remain relatively uninfluential with 
government because they are disorganized or 
divided as collective entities -  the world of 
business is full o f industries that are ‘eco­
nomic giants yet political dwarfs’. A second is 
the extent to which public administrations, 
under certain circumstances, can be relatively 
insulated from pressures by private interests. 
Central Banks or Health and Safety Execu­
tives are examples of such institutions. Be­
yond this, the dispersal of public authority 
through several institutions, such as the archi­
tecture of the European Union where decision 
making involves the Council of Ministers, 
Commission and Parliament, may enhance 
the autonomy of public authorities from pri­
vate interests, in that agreement at one level 
has to survive another.
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